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The Tail That Wags the Dog: The Problem of Pre-
Merit-Decision Interim Fees and Moral Hazard in the 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 
Timothy M. Todd 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following hypothetical: A prospective client walks into 
a law office and complains of some general pain in her extremities.  She 
tells the lawyer a general medical history, but nothing appears out of the 
ordinary.  Coincidentally, she tells the lawyer that she received a vaccine 
a few weeks ago—not a new, cutting-edge vaccine, but one that most 
people receive without thinking twice about it.  The lawyer immediately 
gives her an engagement letter to sign.  After the client leaves, the lawyer 
hands the file off to another attorney in the office.  The second lawyer 
calls all of the client’s medical providers from the past few years and 
begins to compile the client’s medical records.  Nothing stands out in 
those either, except of course the notations about the vaccine 
administration.  The file then passes from lawyer to lawyer in the office, 
with each attorney billing time to “become familiar” with the facts.  
Noting the references to the vaccine administration in the medical 
records, the lawyers think that the vaccine possibly could have caused 
the pain.  Thus, the lawyers submit a claim to the federal government’s 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program on the client’s behalf. 
After the chain of lawyers in the office talk to every doctor 
(including outside doctors), read every page in the file, read hundreds of 
pages of bland medical records, and of course meet to discuss their 
findings (several times), they come to the (obvious) conclusion that 
there’s no smoking gun or really any other evidence that the vaccine 
caused the symptoms or injury.  The client is not charged a dime.  
Nevertheless, the law firm submits a claim for all attorneys’ fees and 
costs to the federal government and then withdraws from the 
representation.  Shortly thereafter, the law firm receives a check from the 
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federal government and cashes it.  And, just like that, it’s on to the next 
case. 
Does this sound too good to be true?  Well, think again.  Under the 
current practice of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 
(VICP), this hypothetical could, in fact, be reality.  This situation arises 
because of two problems in the VICP: (1) the granting of “pre-merit-
decision interim fees” and (2) the current “standard” used to grant those 
fees. 
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (hereinafter the 
“Vaccine Act” or the “Act”)1 created the VICP.  The VICP is in place to 
compensate victims who are injured (or even killed) by vaccines.  
Funded by excise taxes on various vaccines,2 the VICP is a no-fault, 
mandatory alternative to traditional civil litigation against a vaccine 
administrator or manufacturer.3  Due to its no-fault nature, there are 
regulations that dictate if certain symptoms arise after a specific time 
period after the administration of a particular vaccine, the VICP pays 
“compensation” to the victim.4  If, however, a petitioner’s claim does not 
fall within those regulations, he or she can pursue a traditional cause-in-
fact based claim in the VICP.5  The United States Court of Federal 
Claims—in particular, its Office of Special Masters—serves as the finder 
of fact and holds quasi-judicial proceedings under the VICP.6 
The VICP pays attorneys’ fees and costs if the petition for 
compensation is successful.7  Unique to the VICP, however, is that it 
often pays attorneys’ fees and costs even if the petition is unsuccessful 
on the merits.8  Even more remarkable—and troubling—is that, due to 
two decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit,9 attorneys’ fees and costs can be paid to attorneys even before a 
                                                          
 1.  Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 
-34 (2012)). 
 2.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(i)(2) (2012) (noting payments are to be made from the “Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Trust Fund”); 26 U.S.C. § 9510 (2012) (creating the Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Trust Fund); 26 U.S.C. § 4131 (2012) (imposing a seventy-five-cent excise tax on 
any taxable vaccine). 
 3.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2) (2012). 
 4.  These are known as “table injuries.”  See infra Part II.B (discussing table injuries). 
 5.  The VICP and its operation are discussed in more detail infra at Part II.B. 
 6.  42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12 (2012). 
 7.  Id. § 300aa-15(e)(1). 
 8.  Id. (flush language). 
 9.  Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 609 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Avera v. Sec’y 
of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also infra Part III.D (discussing the 
effect of these cases on the VICP). 
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decision is made on the case’s merits, that is, “pre-merit-decision interim 
fees.”10  Many cases have even allowed the payment of attorneys’ fees to 
a withdrawing attorney before the merit decision.11 
The practice of awarding pre-merit-decision interim fees is hugely 
problematic for the VICP.  It is contrary to a fair reading of the Vaccine 
Act, cuts against the historical operation of the VICP, and is contrary to 
congressional intent.  It also creates a remarkable moral hazard problem: 
neither the petitioner nor the petitioner’s lawyer has any incentive to 
police litigation costs because the taxpayer is paying those costs—win or 
lose.  The moral hazard problem, moreover, has other unintended 
consequences—for example, a clogging of the Court of Federal Claims’ 
docket.  There is even evidence that increased vaccine litigation is 
affecting the Federal Circuit’s docket, too.12  Furthermore, because the 
VICP is funded by excise taxes, any moral hazard problem that leads to 
an unnecessary payment of funds may lead to increased vaccine costs for 
the public (as those taxes may need to be increased), which could have 
unforeseen public health consequences in the long run. 
This Article therefore argues that the current practice of awarding 
pre-merit-decision interim fees must stop.  Using bedrock principles and 
canons of statutory interpretation, this Article demonstrates why a fair 
reading of the Vaccine Act requires a merit decision before any payment 
of funds can be made from the VICP.  Part II discusses the history of 
vaccine litigation in the United States, explores the Vaccine Act, and 
provides an overview of how the VICP operates.  Part III demonstrates 
the problem of pre-merit-decision interim fees, discusses how it arose by 
two decisions of the Federal Circuit, and explains how those two 
decisions have greatly affected the VICP today.  Finally, Part IV shows 
how—the current practice notwithstanding—bedrock principles and 
                                                          
 10.  See, e.g., Shaw, 609 F.3d at 1378. 
 11.  See, e.g., D. Golmakani v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-577V, 2013 WL 
4009664 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 7, 2013); Toor v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-
650V, 2013 WL 4011097 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 3, 2013); Allen v. Sec’y of Health & Human 
Servs., No. 11-051V, 2013 WL 3185256 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 30, 2013); Wright v. Sec’y of 
Health & Human Servs., No. 10-222V, 2013 WL 1800373 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 4, 2013); Jakes 
v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 06-831V, 2013 WL 1150518 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 19, 
2013); Hiland v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-491V, 2012 WL 542683 (Fed. Cl. Spec. 
Mstr. Jan. 31, 2012); Woods v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-377V, 2011 WL 6957598 
(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 16, 2011). 
 12.  See Brandon L. Boxler, Fixing the Vaccine Act’s Structural Moral Hazard, 12 PEPP. DISP. 
RESOL. L.J. 1, 35 (2012) (noting that petitioners file appeals, petitions for rehearing, and petitions for 
rehearing en banc at a rate that far surpasses the government because the fees are eventually paid by 
the taxpayer). 
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canons of statutory interpretation preclude any pre-merit-decision 
payment of attorneys’ fees and costs from the VICP. 
II. HISTORY OF VACCINE LITIGATION AND THE VACCINE INJURY 
COMPENSATION PROGRAM 
A. Common Law Vaccine Litigation in the United States 
1. Vaccine Litigation Before the Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program 
Undoubtedly, vaccination against life-threatening and debilitating 
illnesses is one of the crowning achievements in the history of public 
health.13  Consequently, all fifty states have compulsory vaccination 
laws.14  Ordinarily, compliance with these laws is a prerequisite for 
school enrollment.15  Some estimates indicate that 57,000 children are 
                                                          
 13.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6345 
(“Vaccination of children against deadly, disabling, but preventable infectious diseases has been one 
of the most spectacularly effective public health initiatives this country has ever undertaken.”); see 
also Erica A. Little, Note, The Role of Special Masters in Off-Table Vaccination Compensation 
Cases: Assuring Flexibility over Certainty, 16 FED. CIR. B.J. 355, 355 (2007) (stating “[m]any 
trumpet childhood immunization as one of the most successful public health efforts in the United 
States”).  For example, polio is nearly eliminated from the Western Hemisphere due to mass-
vaccination protocols.  See Lisa J. Steel, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program: Is This the Best We Can Do for Our Children?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 144, 149 (1994).  
Interestingly, there exists evidence of “vaccination” protocols as early as the first millennium.  See 
Stephen P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting Out of 
Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 363–64 (2004); James G. Hodge, Jr. & 
Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements: Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 
90 KY. L.J. 831, 837 (2002).  For example, in India—even prior to 1000 A.D.—patients would be 
exposed intentionally to smallpox to create immunity.  Calandrillo, supra, at 364 (citing Donald A. 
Henderson & Bernard Moss, Smallpox and Vaccinia, in VACCINES 74 (Stanley A. Plotkin & Walter 
A. Orenstein eds., 3d ed. 1999)). 
 14.  Boxler, supra note 12, at 4–5; see, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48216 (West 2006); CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120325 (West 2012); D.C. CODE § 38-502 (2001); MD. CODE ANN. 
EDUC. §§ 7-403(a)(2), (b) (West 2012); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 914(1) (McKinney 2007); N.Y. PUB. 
HEALTH LAW §§ 2164(8)–(9) (McKinney 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.671(A)(1), (B) 
(West 2012); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1303a(a), (c)-(d) (West 2006); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 
22.1-271.2(A), -271.2(C), 32.1-46 (2014); see also Kimberly J. Garde, This Will Only Hurt For 
Ever: Compulsory Vaccine Laws, Injured Children, and No Redress, 3 PHOENIX L. REV. 509, app. A 
at 555–66 (2010) (listing statutes). 
 15.  See Garde, supra note 14, at 518.  Some states have exemptions for medical, religious, or 
philosophical reasons.  See id.  Two states, however, have exemptions for medical reasons only.  See 
id.; see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-23-37 (2007); W. VA. CODE § 16-3-4 (2008).  Depending on the 
rigor of the law, however, exemptions, even when allowed, may be difficult to obtain.  See Steel, 
supra note 13, at 145.  Nevertheless, the constitutionality of required vaccination has been 
established.  See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26–27 (1905). 
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vaccinated each week.16  Despite the public health benefits,17 vaccines 
are not free from risks.18  Because vaccines contain “attenuated viruses, 
chemical preservatives, and adjuvants,”19 reactions occur that can lead to 
injury or even death.20  In fact, current evidence suggests that “between 
January 1990 and January 2010, at least 3,188 people died following 
vaccination; 5,123 people reported life-threatening injuries following 
vaccination; 5,603 people were permanently disabled following 
vaccination; and 129,763 people were hospitalized following 
vaccination, including prolonged hospitalization and emergency room 
visits.”21  These numbers are only those reported; some studies have 
estimated that these data encapsulate only between one and ten percent 
of actual adverse vaccine reactions.22 
Before the advent of the VICP, those injured by vaccines turned to 
the courts, the only recourse available.23  As the number of government-
                                                          
 16.  See Steel, supra note 13, at 145. 
 17.  Experts attribute a dramatic reduction in many diseases to mass-vaccination efforts.  See, 
e.g., Garde, supra note 14, at 519–20.  For example, “[p]rior to the availability of measles vaccines, 
nearly everyone in the United States contracted measles, yet only 450 deaths were reported each year 
from 1953–63; the CDC, however, predicts that completely stopping measles vaccinations would 
cause an annual death toll of 2.7 million people worldwide.”  Id. at 520 (citations omitted).  “Prior to 
the availability of pneumococcal conjugate vaccines, 63,000 cases of pneumococcal disease with 
6,100 deaths were reported each year in the United States; however, reports have decreased 75% 
since the introduction of the pneumococcal vaccine.”  Id. (citing What Would Happen If We Stopped 
Vaccinations?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREV. (2003), http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-
gen/whatifstop.htm (last updated May 19, 2014)). 
 18.  Boxler, supra note 12, at 4. 
 19.  Id.; see, e.g., Brandon L. Boxler, What to Do With Daubert: How to Bring Standards of 
Reliable Scientific Evidence to the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1319, 1325 (2011). 
 20.  Boxler, supra note 12, at 4. 
 21.  Garde, supra note 14, at 526–27 (citing VAERS data, CDC WONDER On-line Database: 
Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREV., http://wonder. 
cdc.gov/vaers.html (last updated May 19, 2014)); see also infra note 181 (explaining VAERS data). 
 22.  Garde, supra note 14, at 527 (citing CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., THE CLINICAL IMPACT OF ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING 5 (1996), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Safety/MedWatch/UCM168505.pdf); see Steven Rosenthal & Robert 
Chen, The Reporting Sensitivities of Two Passive Surveillance Systems for Vaccine Adverse Events, 
85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1706, 1708 (1995), available at http://ajph.aphapublications.org 
/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.85.12.1706 (finding that “reporting sensitivities for adverse [vaccine] events 
surveillance in the United States varied widely, ranging from 72% for vaccine-associated 
poliomyelitis to less than 1% for acute thrombocytopenic purpura following the MMR vaccine and 
hypotonic-hyporesponsive episodes following the DTP vaccine”); see also M. Miles Braun, Vaccine 
Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS): Usefulness and Limitations, INSTITUTE FOR VACCINE 
SAFETY, www.vaccinesafety.edu/VAERS.htm (last updated Feb. 12, 2014) (“Underreporting is an 
inherent problem of passive surveillance systems, including VAERS.”). 
 23.  Some commentators have advanced the position that drug companies should not be held 
responsible at all for vaccine injuries as the companies are merely producing vaccines in compliance 
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mandated vaccines increased, so did the injuries and lawsuits.24  These 
lawsuits alleged design defects, manufacturing defects, and other product 
liability causes of actions.25  The first major case was Gottsdanker v. 
Cutter Laboratories,26 involving two children who contracted 
poliomyelitis after receiving the Salk oral polio vaccine manufactured by 
Cutter Laboratories.27  The jury returned a verdict of $139,000 for the 
children and $8,300 in special damages for the parents.28  A few years 
later, in Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co.,29 a federal district court 
awarded over $650,000 for an infant who had suffered severe seizures, 
right-side paralysis, mental retardation, and other medical issues after 
vaccination.30 
2. The Effect of Vaccine Litigation on the Vaccine Market 
Because of these lawsuits, among others,31 and their attendant costs, 
pharmaceutical companies stopped, or threatened to stop, producing 
vaccines.32  The reality was frightening for these pharmaceutical 
companies.  For example, in 1984, Lederle was the only commercial 
manufacturer of the diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis vaccine, and its 
potential legal liability exposure was more than two hundred times its 
annual sales.33  The vaccine manufacturers’ legal defense costs in 1984 
                                                                                                                                  
with federal standards.  See Steel, supra note 13, at 146.  To support this position, they argue that 
because society as a whole benefits from vaccination, “society” should bear the costs.  See id. 
 24.  Boxler, supra note 12, at 6.  For example, one authority has the number of vaccine lawsuits 
in 1980 at 24, and in 1985 that number rose to 150.  See id. (citing Mary Beth Neraas, Comment, 
The National Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A Solution to the Vaccine Liability Crisis?, 63 WASH. L. 
REV. 149, 151 & n.15 (1988)). 
 25.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (noting liability of seller for 
defective products causing physical harm to user). 
 26.  6 Cal. Rptr. 320, 322 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960). 
 27.  “Poliomyelitis” is “[a]n inflammatory process involving the gray matter of the cord.”  
STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1400 (26th ed. 1995).  See Gottsdanker, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 322. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  285 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 30.  Id. at 437, 454. 
 31.  See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974); Davis v. Wyeth Labs., 399 
F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); see also Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 573 F. Supp. 1324, 1325, 1330 
(C.D. Cal. 1983) (permitting even punitive damages under a market share theory). 
 32.  Boxler, supra note 12, at 6. 
 33.  Id. at 6–7.  Some manufacturers, such as Connaught and Wyeth, even stopped making the 
DPT vaccine.  See Jaclyn S. Levine, Note, The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: 
Can It Still Protect An Essential Technology?, 4 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 9, n.7 (citing 131 Cong. 
Rec. S3843-04 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1985) (statement of Sen. Hawkins)). 
TODD VACCINE ACT_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/11/2014  9:47 AM 
2014] THE TAIL THAT WAGS THE DOG 7 
were estimated at $9.8 million.34  To make up for this exposure gap, 
naturally, vaccine prices increased.  To illustrate, “[t]he price of a dose of 
DPT rose from ten cents in 1982 to more than $3.00 in 1986.”35  Other 
estimates have vaccine prices skyrocketing by 2,000 percent.36  
Consequently, Congress entered the fray in the belief that the legal 
system’s “failure” to adjudicate these claims combined with the effect on 
the vaccine market constituted a public health emergency.37  Congress 
therefore enacted the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Act of 1986, which created the VICP.38 
B. The Vaccine Act and the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 
The goals of the Act, according to its legislative history, are twofold: 
(1) to ensure adequate compensation for those injured by vaccines and 
(2) to promote stability in the vaccine market.39  To achieve these goals, 
the federal government acts as a financial backstop.  The system put in 
place by the Act has two separate but related parts.  Part one of the 
system establishes the “no fault” compensation scheme,40 the impetus 
being to make awards to “vaccine-injured persons quickly, easily, and 
with certainty and generosity.”41  The money for this part of the VICP 
comes from a tax levied on designated vaccines.42  Part two of the system 
establishes additional remedies should the injured person reject an award 
under the VICP.43 
At base, the Act effectuates its policy by exclusion.  In other words, 
an injured person cannot pursue a traditional common-law tort action 
against a vaccine manufacturer until that person completes the VICP 
                                                          
 34.  See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH & THE ENV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON ENERGY & 
COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., REP. ON CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS 87 (Comm. Print 1986); see also 
Steel, supra note 13, at 153. 
 35.  Steel, supra note 13, at 153 n.100 (citing Okianer C. Dark, Is the National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 the Solution for the DTP Controversy?, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 799, 855 
(1988)). 
 36.  See H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 509 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2235; see 
also Randall B. Keiser, Déjà vu All Over Again? The National Childhood Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Act of 1986, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 15, 16 (1992). 
 37.  Boxler, supra note 12, at 7. 
 38.  42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2012). 
 39.  H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6348. 
 40.  Id. at 3. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
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process.44  The Act’s hope, of course, is that the injured person will 
accept the compensation allowed under the Act through the VICP and 
will not resort to the common-law tort action. 
Under the Act, “[a] proceeding for compensation under the [VICP] 
for a vaccine-related injury or death” is initiated by serving the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services with a petition for compensation and 
paying the filing fee.45  In the petition, the petitioner is required to 
demonstrate that the person received the vaccine in the United States; 
sustained or aggravated any illness, disability, or injury (and the date of 
onset);46 suffered the residual effects of such illness for more than six 
months after the date of vaccination; and has not previously collected an 
award or settlement for the vaccine injury.47  In addition, the petitioner is 
required to submit a plethora of medical records.48 
After the petition is filed, the Act gives the Court of Federal Claims, 
acting through the court’s Office of Special Masters, “jurisdiction over 
[the] proceedings to determine if a petitioner . . . is entitled to 
compensation under the [VICP] and the amount of such 
compensation.”49  The petition is assigned to a special master, who is to 
“issue a decision on such petition with respect to whether compensation 
is to be provided under the [VICP] and the amount of such 
                                                          
 44.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A) (2012) (“No person may bring a civil action for 
damages in an amount greater than $1,000 or in an unspecified amount against a vaccine 
administrator or manufacturer in a State or Federal court for damages arising from a vaccine-related 
injury or death associated with the administration of a vaccine after October 1, 1988, and no such 
court may award damages in an amount greater than $1,000 in a civil action for damages for such a 
vaccine-related injury or death, unless a petition has been filed, in accordance with section 300aa-16 
of this title, for compensation under the Program for such injury or death . . . .”). 
 45.  Vaccine Rules of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims 2, app. B of the Rules of the Court of 
Federal Claims, available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/court_info/ 
20130813_rules/13.08.30%20Final%20Version%20of%20Vaccine%20Rules.pdf [hereinafter  FED. 
CL. VACCINE R.]. 
 46.  The date of onset is paramount for statute of limitations purposes.  It is not the act of 
vaccination that triggers the beginning of the statute of limitations period; it is the date of symptom 
onset.  42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2) (2012); see also Markovich v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
477 F.3d 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Under the plain language of the Vaccine Act, the ‘first 
symptom or manifestation of onset’ of injury means that either a ‘symptom’ or a ‘manifestation of 
onset’ can trigger the running of the statute, whichever is first.  Because Congress is presumed to 
have intended a disjunctive meaning by using the disjunctive word ‘or,’ we interpret the words ‘first 
symptom’ and ‘manifestation of onset’ as referring to two different forms of evidence of injury.”). 
 47.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c) (2012); see also FED. CL. VACCINE R. 2(c) (prescribing the 
contents of a petition). 
 48.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c). 
 49.  Id. § 300aa-12(a). 
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compensation.”50  The decision is required to contain findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, and it is to be rendered generally within 240 days 
after the petition is filed.51 
To come to the statutorily required decision regarding compensation, 
the Act allows the special master to conduct a proceeding,52 through 
which the special master may order the parties to submit testimony, 
evidence, or other information deemed relevant.53  The special master is 
not bound by rules of evidence or even required to allow direct or cross-
examinations; rather, all that is required is for the special master to 
consider “all relevant and reliable evidence governed by principles of 
fundamental fairness to both parties.”54  The special master is directed, in 
fact, to “make the proceedings expeditious, flexible, and less 
adversarial . . . .”55  In sum, the special master presides over a quasi-
judicial proceeding.56 
The Act commands that “[c]ompensation shall be awarded” if the 
special master or court finds that the petitioner has demonstrated by a 
preponderance of the evidence the matters that are required to be alleged 
in the petition, and if there is no non-vaccine cause for the illness or 
injury.57 
Because part of the Act is a no-fault system for compensation, the 
Act relaxes the petitioner’s traditional civil burdens in some ways.  The 
Act has a “vaccine table”58 that allows a “finding of causation in a field 
                                                          
 50.  Id. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(A).  The Secretary is also to provide a report within thirty days noting 
whether any required documentation is missing and provide a report within ninety days setting forth 
its position regarding the payment of compensation.  FED. CL. VACCINE R. 4. 
 51.  Id.; FED. CL. VACCINE R. 10.  There is some evidence, however, that this time frame is not 
being complied with.  See Peter H. Meyers, Fixing the Flaws in the Federal Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 785, 789 (2011) (noting that “virtually no cases are 
concluded within the 240-day deadline . . . .”). 
 52.  Such a proceeding is not required, however.  See FED. CL. VACCINE R. 8(d); Burns ex rel. 
Burns v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 415, 417 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 53.  42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(B). 
 54.  FED. CL. VACCINE R. 8(b), 3(b); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(B). 
 55.  FED. CL. VACCINE R. 3(b)(2). 
 56.  Some commentators have argued that the VICP is becoming “too adversarial,” and is 
therefore contrary to the original purpose and intent of the VICP.  See, e.g., Meyers, supra note 51, 
at 808–09; Lawrence O. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman, Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law, and the 
Public’s Health, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 136 (2007) (“Moreover, [the] VICP has become 
adversarial, burdensome on claimants, and time consuming.”); see also Lawrence O. Gostin, 
Medical Countermeasures for Pandemic Influenza: Ethics and the Law, 295 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 554, 
555 (2006). 
 57.  42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13. 
 58.  See id. § 300aa-14(a); see also 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2013).  The Secretary is authorized to 
amend the table as necessary based on the advice of, inter alia, the Advisory Commission on 
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bereft of complete and direct proof of how vaccines affect the human 
body.”59  Thus, petitioners can establish an entitlement to compensation 
by, inter alia, proving that they suffered a specific injury on the vaccine 
table; this is known as a “table injury” case.  If a petitioner shows by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he or she received an injury listed on 
the table within the requisite time frame, the petitioner is presumptively 
entitled to compensation.60  For example, if a petitioner went into 
anaphylactic shock within twenty-four hours of receiving a DTP vaccine, 
she would be entitled to a presumption of compensation.61  To rebut the 
presumption, the government has the burden to show some non-vaccine 
cause of the injury.62 
If, however, the claimant cannot establish a table injury, the 
petitioner can proceed “off table.”63  In this scenario, as in traditional tort 
liability, the petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the vaccine is the “but for” cause and a substantial factor in bringing 
about that injury.64  This approach naturally may require medical 
experts,65 and like any other pharmaceutical defect case, it can become a 
costly and time-intensive endeavor.  A petitioner need not, however, 
eliminate all possible alternate causes of injury.66 
                                                                                                                                  
Childhood Vaccines.  42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-14(c)(2), -19. 
 59.  Althen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 418 F.3d 1274, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 60.  See, e.g., Andreu ex rel. Andreu v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 569 F.3d 1367, 1374 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (“In a table claim, a claimant who shows that he or she received a vaccination listed 
in the Vaccine Injury Table . . . and suffered an injury listed in the table within a prescribed period is 
afforded a presumption of causation.”). 
 61.  42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(a)(I)(A). 
 62.  See, e.g., Pafford v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 451 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (“[T]he burden shifts to the respondent to prove that a factor unrelated to the vaccination 
actually caused the illness, disability, injury, or condition.”). 
 63.  Recently, most cases in the VICP have been “off table.”  See Meyers, supra note 51, at 798 
(noting that from 2007 to 2010, “almost 90% of the petitions filed assert only non-Table injuries”). 
 64.  Moberly ex rel. Moberly v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 592 F.3d 1315, 1321–22 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[A] petitioner in a Vaccine Act case must show that the vaccine was ‘not only a 
but-for cause of the injury but also a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.’” (quoting 
Shyface v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 165 F.3d 1344, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).  In Althen 
v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 418 F.3d 1274, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the Federal Circuit held 
that the petitioner, in proceeding off-table, must establish “(1) a medical theory causally connect[s] 
the vaccination and the injury; (2) a logical sequence of cause and effect show[s] that the vaccination 
was the reason for the injury; and (3) a showing of a proximate temporal relationship between [the] 
vaccination and the injury.” 
 65.  Petitioners need not prove their case with scientific certainty.  See Althen, 418 F.3d at 1280 
(noting that requiring medical literature to prove causation would impermissibly raise the plaintiff’s 
burden of proof). 
 66.  See Shyface, 165 F.3d at 1351 (noting that in determining whether “[an] injury was not 
caused by factors unrelated to the vaccine, the court [does not need] to include speculative or 
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Assuming a petitioner is successful, either in a table or off-table case, 
the Act mandates the payment of compensation.  Allowable 
“compensation” under the Act is defined by statute.67  Statute 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300aa-15 prescribes that an award of compensation “shall” include 
seven possible items.  The first item is actual unreimbursable expenses 
incurred from the date of the judgment and reasonable projected 
unreimbursable expenses that are attributable to the vaccine-related 
injury, including medical care, diagnosis, and an array of rehabilitation 
services, namely, traditional compensatory-type damages.68  The second 
item is actual unreimbursable expenses incurred before the date of the 
judgment that resulted from the vaccine-related injury, including medical 
and remedial care.69  The third item of compensation arises only in the 
case of a vaccine-related death and is a payment of $250,000 to the estate 
of the deceased.70  The fourth item, the actual and anticipated loss of 
earnings, is for petitioners over eighteen years old who, due to the 
vaccine-related injury, have suffered a diminution in earning potential.71  
The fifth item, designed to simulate the earnings of an average worker in 
the private sector (after certain withholdings), is for petitioners under 
eighteen years old who have an injury so severe that it is likely to impair 
earning potential at the age of eighteen and beyond.72  The sixth item is 
for actual and projected pain and suffering but is not to exceed 
$250,000.73  Finally, seventh, if compensation is awarded—i.e., if the 
petition is successful on the merits—the Act also directs the special 
master to award, “as part of such compensation,” an amount to cover 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and other costs.74 
After the special master issues the decision on the merits, either party 
can file a motion with the clerk of court for a judge of the United States 
Court of Federal Claims to review the special master’s decision.75  
                                                                                                                                  
hypothetical matters or explanations.”). 
 67.  42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15 (2012). 
 68.  Id. § 300aa-15(a)(1)(A). 
 69.  Id. § 300aa-15(a)(1)(B). 
 70.  Id. § 300aa-15(a)(2). 
 71.  Id. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(A). 
 72.  Id. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(B). 
 73.  Id. § 300aa-15(a)(4). 
 74.  Id. § 300aa-15(e) (providing that attorneys’ fees may be granted even if the petitioner is not 
successful on the merits if the special master finds that the petition was brought in good faith and 
that there was a reasonable basis for the underlying claim in the petition).  See infra Parts III.A and 
III.E. 
 75.  Id. § 300aa-12(e)(1). 
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During this review, the judge can uphold the special master’s findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, thereby sustaining the decision; the judge 
can set aside findings of fact or conclusions of law and issue the court’s 
own findings and conclusions; or the judge can remand the petition to the 
special master for further proceedings.76 
Interestingly, unlike other fee-shifting statutes, non-prevailing 
petitioners can still be awarded attorneys’ fees and costs.77  Under 42 
U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1), a petitioner may request attorneys’ fees, even if 
he or she does not prevail on the merits, as long as the claim was brought 
in “good faith” and with a “reasonable basis.”78  This, in part, is what 
creates the moral hazard problem in the VICP. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF PRE-MERIT-DECISION INTERIM FEE AWARDS IN 
THE VICP 
A. Overview of the Problem 
The hopeful path of a petition under the Act is intended to be 
relatively simple, especially for a table injury.  The petitioner collects all 
of the medical records, fills out the petition, and files the paperwork; if 
everything is in order, the government likely will not oppose the payment 
of compensation, because that’s why the money is available—to be doled 
out to those injured by vaccines.  The special master will award 
compensation based on the allowable elements in 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15, 
and, if an attorney is involved, issue attorneys’ fees too.  As long as there 
is no dispute from the government, that’s it—case over.  For a growing 
percentage of cases in the VICP, however, that’s not how it’s working.79 
There are two major problems with the current operation of the VICP 
due to the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the Act.  The first problem 
is the allowance of pre-merit-decision interim attorneys’ fees—that is, 
attorneys’ fees and costs that are paid—with tax dollars—before any 
decision is rendered on the merits of the petition, either favorably or 
unfavorably.  The second problem is the standard (or lack thereof) used 
                                                          
 76.  Id. § 300aa-12(e)(2). 
 77.  See, e.g., Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 78.  See id. at 1346. 
 79.  See, e.g., National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Statistics Report, HEALTH RES. 
& SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/statisticsreports.html (last updated 
Mar. 5, 2014) [hereinafter VICP Statistics] (showing growing number of interim fee cases); see also 
infra Part III.B (explaining how interim fee cases complicate cases and clog the court’s docket). 
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to decide whether to issue interim fees.  For the first twenty-six fiscal 
years that the VICP operated, it paid nearly $180 million in attorneys’ 
fees and costs.80  For the first nineteen of those years, however, not a 
single dime of interim fees (whether pre- or post-merit) was paid.81  That 
all changed, however, with the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Avera v. 
Secretary of Health & Human Services82 and Shaw v. Secretary of Health 
& Human Services.83  Since those cases, the VICP has paid over $16.5 
million in “interim fees.”84  These two cases, therefore, have served as a 
license, allowing the special masters to dole out taxpayer money in a 
radically different fashion than that historically allowed under the Act.  
In fact, interim attorneys’ fees and costs account for nearly one-fifth of 
all fees and costs awarded over that same time period. 
B. Moral Hazard Encourages Extra Litigation and Potential 
“Churning” in the VICP 
There are myriad public policy concerns with the advent and growth 
of pre-merit-decision interim fee litigation in the VICP.  Chief of these 
problems is that this litigation increases the moral hazard already 
structurally built into the VICP.85  Moral hazard is the economic 
phenomenon that insurance against loss reduces incentives to prevent or 
mitigate that loss.86  Here, the insurance is the multiple levels of “free” 
judicial review (special masters, Court of Federal Claims, Federal 
Circuit, and Supreme Court) and the economic loss (or lack thereof) is 
the cost of litigation, which is now picked up by the taxpayer, not the 
                                                          
 80.  Id.  Granted, this total seems small in comparison to the over $2.6 billion in merit awards 
that the VICP paid out for merit decisions.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  515 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 83.  609 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 84.  VICP Statistics, supra note 79.  The table providing for the payment of attorneys’ fees does 
not indicate whether these are all pre-merit-decision fees or include fees for cases that are pending 
appeal and might still be considered “interim.”  Based on the current usage of “interim” in the VICP, 
however, there is a strong likelihood that this does mean pre-merit-decision fees. 
 85.  Commentators have already noted the moral hazards of the VICP.  See generally Boxler, 
supra note 12. 
 86.  Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 239 (1996) 
(‘“[M]oral hazard’ refers to the tendency for insurance against loss to reduce incentives to prevent or 
minimize the cost of loss.”); see also Boxler, supra note 12, at 25.  Others have defined moral hazard 
as a situation in which “one party is responsible for the interests of another, but has an incentive to 
put his or her own interests first.”  Kevin Dowd, Moral Hazard and the Financial Crisis, 29 CATO J. 
141, 142 (2009). 
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plaintiff or plaintiff’s counsel as in traditional civil litigation.87  
Basically, the person who makes the decision to litigate (the petitioner or 
petitioner’s lawyer) is not the one who ultimately bears the economic 
risk of loss (litigation costs). 
Commentators have lambasted the Vaccine Act for its inherent moral 
hazard problem—namely, the shifting of litigation fees from private 
parties to the taxpayer.88  This statutory scheme, as some have noted, 
creates “perverse incentives.”89  With automatic fees if you win—and 
basically automatic fees if you lose90—there is no reason to ever stop 
litigating in the VICP!91  There are multiple levels of appellate review for 
both the merit decision and now, on top of that, the pre-merit-decision 
interim fee decision.  Thus, there is little downside—at least no 
economic downside—for an opportunistic attorney, who can exhaust 
every option on every issue at the ultimate expense of the taxpayer.92 
While commentators have noted the moral hazard problem regarding 
financially riskless appeals on merit decisions in the VICP,93 nobody has 
addressed the particular problem regarding pre-merit-decision interim 
fees.  The moral hazard problem on interim fees is even more troubling, 
as the fees inure only to the lawyer: there is no potential upside or 
economic gain for the client.  In multiple levels of appellate review on 
merit decisions, there is at least a chance that one of the Court of Federal 
Claims or Federal Circuit judges could find favorably for the petitioner 
on the merits, and therefore substantively change the outcome on 
compensation.  By definition, however, that cannot happen on pre-merit-
decision interim fee review—the underlying merit decision has not yet 
been reached and therefore cannot be changed.  The only one who can 
possibly benefit is the petitioner’s counsel at the expense of the taxpayer. 
Because there is no financial risk to pursuing these claims, including 
pre-merit-decision interim fees, this unnecessarily clogs and burdens the 
special masters’ and judges’ dockets of the court.94  For instance, for 
                                                          
 87.  See Boxler, supra note 12, at 24–25. 
 88.  See generally id. 
 89.  See id. at 24. 
 90.  See infra Part III.E (discussing McKellar and the standard for interim fees). 
 91.  Boxler, supra note 12, at 24. 
 92.  Some have argued that the many levels of financially riskless appeals on merits decisions 
in the VICP effectively makes the special master decision precatory because a Court of Federal 
Claims or Federal Circuit judge almost invariably will be the ultimate decider of the case.  See id. at 
26. 
 93.  See id. at 25–26. 
 94.  See, e.g., Meyers, supra note 51, at 848 (“The payment of attorneys’ fees and costs has 
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fiscal year 2012, there were 250 successful VICP awards,95 and there 
were 37 interim fee awards,96 for a ratio of 7:1.  In 2008—just a few 
years earlier—that ratio was 71:1.97  What can be inferred, in part, from 
this admittedly small sample size is that, everything else being equal, in 
2012 (compared to 2008) less of the court’s time was likely spent on 
adjudicating merit-based claims—which is the mission of the VICP.  
Time and the fixed resources of the court’s staff are being spent away 
from merit decisions to adjudicate these pre-merit-decision interim award 
disputes at multiple levels of review. 
The current interpretation of the Act, leading to the moral hazard 
problem, also encourages “churning”—that is, the practice of 
intentionally driving up fees and expenses unnecessarily.  In the financial 
services context, for example, this occurs when a broker trades a stock 
many times, unnecessarily, to drive up commissions and fees.98  Simply 
put, it is a situation where the agent benefits to the detriment of the 
principal.  Because the standard—if we can actually call it that—for 
interim fees is so loose and lawyer-friendly,99 it encourages (in theory) 
passing a file from lawyer to lawyer and thereby driving up the costs of 
representation,100 or to take a case and spend money on it that the lawyer 
would not otherwise spend.  The client does not care, as the client is not 
                                                                                                                                  
generated considerable litigation in the Vaccine Program.”). 
 95.  VICP Statistics, supra note 79. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Larry A. Cerutti, SEC Rule 10b-16: Should the Federal Courts Allow Sophisticated 
Investors to Recover?, 18 PAC. L.J. 171, 192 (1986) (“Churning occurs when a broker, acting in his 
or her own interests, engages in excessive trading of an account to generate commissions without 
regard to the investment objectives of the customer.”); Norman S. Poser, Options Account Fraud: 
Securities Churning in a New Context, 39 BUS. LAW. 571, 571 (1984) (“Churning . . . occurs when a 
securities broker or dealer who controls the volume and frequency of trading in a customer’s account 
abuses the customer’s confidence for his own personal gain in order to increase the amount of 
commissions by initiating transactions that are excessive in view of the financial situation and 
investment objectives of the customer.”); Note, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 HARV. L. REV. 
869, 869 (1967) (“The ‘churning’ of a securities account occurs when a dealer, acting in his own 
interests and against those of his customer, induces transactions in the customer’s account which are 
excessive in size and frequency in light of the character of the account.”); see also Thompson v. 
Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 709 F.2d 1413, 1416 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Churning occurs when 
a securities broker buys and sells securities for a customer’s account, without regard to the 
customer’s investment interests, for the purpose of generating commissions.”). 
 99.  See discussion infra Part III.E. 
 100.  The author does not represent that any lawyer in any of the cited cases in this Article 
engaged in unnecessary billing, churning, or otherwise improper use of the VICP.  Rather, the author 
intends to convey that the current operation of the VICP—contrary to its historic practice—
implicitly encourages such conduct to occur, either intentionally or unwittingly. 
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footing the bill.  The problem of moral hazard yet again rears its ugly 
head, and the taxpayer is left with the tab.101 
C. Pre-Merit-Decision Interim Fee Awards Create Disincentives for 
Lawyers to Finish Cases 
The case law has established that an attorney can even withdraw 
from the representation—before the merits of the case are even 
decided—and still be paid attorneys’ fees by the VICP.102  This is exactly 
what the special master was willing to do in McKellar v. Secretary of 
Health & Human Services.103  After McKellar, this has become even 
more common.104  Admittedly, an attorney can withdraw in traditional 
civil litigation and still be paid fees by the client, but in that situation the 
moral hazard calculus is drastically different because either the attorney 
or the plaintiff is bearing the risk of loss; this reduces the likelihood of 
pursuing meritless cases in the first instance.  In the VICP, however, that 
financial risk of loss is borne by the taxpayer—so the attorney has no 
                                                          
 101.  Of course, the government always has the option to object to fees as excessive or 
unnecessary.  However, it would strain credulity to believe that the government is always able to 
ferret out unnecessary or dishonest fee requests.  Moreover, since it is not the government lawyer’s 
money on the table, the moral hazard problem still arises nevertheless. 
 102.  See, e.g., Hiland v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-491V, 2012 WL 542683 (Fed. 
Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 31, 2012).  Judge Bruggink, however, tried to limit the availability of pre-merit-
decision interim fees to withdrawing counsel.  See McKellar v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
101 Fed. Cl. 297, 301 (2011).  There, Judge Bruggink construed Avera to mean that “some special 
showing is necessary to warrant interim fees, including but not limited to the delineated factors of 
protracted proceedings, costly experts, or undue hardship.  If mere good faith and reasonable basis 
were all that is necessary, the Avera factors become superfluous and interim fees would be the 
norm.”  Id.  His words were prophetic—interim fees are now the norm in the program.  Some special 
masters have expressly eschewed Judge Bruggink’s reasoning in McKellar.  See, e.g., Hiland, 2012 
WL 542683, at *6 (“To the extent that the court in McKellar held that withdrawal of an attorney is 
not a circumstance in which an interim fee award is appropriate, the undersigned respectfully 
disagrees.”). 
 103.  No. 09-841V, 2011 WL 3425606 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jun. 3, 2011), rev’d, 101 Fed. Cl. 
297 (2011); see also infra Part III.E (discussing McKellar in more detail). 
 104.  See, e.g., Stumpf v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-1711V, 2011 WL 6890165 
(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 4, 2011) (granting interim fees to withdrawing counsel); Coiro-Lorusso v. 
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 04-258V, 2011 WL 6000600 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 5, 
2011) (same); Loutos v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 03-355V, 2011 WL 6000775 (Fed. 
Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 5, 2011) (same); Lockhart v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-1416V, 
2011 WL 5299242 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 29, 2011) (same); Feld v. Sec’y of Health & Human 
Servs., No. 02-1319V, 2011 WL 5248341 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 28, 2011) (same); Dyer-
Alexander v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 04-293V, 2011 WL 5299039 (Fed. Cl. Spec. 
Mstr. Sept. 28, 2011) (same); Moriarty v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 03-257V, 2011 WL 
5299249 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 28, 2011) (same); Deliberis ex rel. Deliberis v. Sec’y of Health 
& Human Servs., No. 01-613V, 2011 WL 5299423 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 28, 2011) (same). 
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incentive not to take a case!  This is compounded further by the 
subjective approach to granting interim fees; attorneys can almost be 
guaranteed payment of interim fees as long as there was no express 
knowledge that the case was frivolous.105 
Moreover, in many cases, when the attorney withdraws, the 
petitioner is forced to act pro se.  Pro se litigants are at a disadvantage in 
traditional civil litigation.106  The VICP is foreign to most lawyers; how 
is a pro se litigant supposed to ably navigate its procedure and substance? 
One of the policies given lip service in granting these pre-merit-
decision interim fees was to provide an able bar of attorneys for those 
injured—recognizing that attorneys knowledgeable in the Act and the 
VICP are assuredly a boon to those injured.  But now that policy is 
turned on its head, as there is now a real financial incentive to leave the 
case pre-merit-decision—the very decision that is most important.  This 
concern is particularly valid when the case involves a non-table injury, 
that is, when the petitioner has to prove causation.  Often this is 
accomplished by expert testimony, submission of scientific studies, and 
the panoply of evidence traditionally used in civil medical malpractice 
and pharmaceutical defect cases.  These are the most complicated and 
costly cases but now the attorney—if he or she thinks the case may not 
be a sure winner—has an incentive to get out before investing the costs 
in compiling all that evidence and testimony—and he will still get 
paid.107  This does not leave those injured in a favorable position, and 
thus runs counter to the purpose of the VICP. 
                                                          
 105.  See discussion infra Part III.E. 
 106.  See, e.g., Judith G. McMullen & Debra Oswald, Why Do We Need a Lawyer? An Empirical 
Study of Divorce Cases, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 57, 78 (2010) (finding that “maintenance was most 
likely to be awarded in cases where both husband and wife had representation”); Richard W. Painter, 
Pro Se Litigation in Times of Financial Hardship—A Legal Crisis and Its Solutions, 45 FAM. L.Q. 
45, 46 (2011) (noting an ABA study finding that “[s]ixty-two percent of the judges [surveyed] said 
that outcomes were worse for the unrepresented parties; while 37% of the judges said there was no 
impact from lack of representation; and 3% said that outcomes were better.”); see also ABA COAL. 
FOR JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE SURVEY OF JUDGES ON THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN  
ON REPRESENTATION IN THE COURTS (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content 
/dam/aba/migrated/JusticeCenter/PublicDocuments/CoalitionforJusticeSurveyReport.authcheckdam.
pdf (finding that significant percentages of judges surveyed found pro se litigants were 
underprepared and needed staff assistance); Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Examination of Access to 
Chapter 7 Relief by Pro Se Debtors, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 5, 23 (2009) (noting a higher 
percentage of pro se petitions are dismissed in bankruptcy than those represented by counsel); 
Carroll Seron, Martin Frankel, Gregg Van Ryzin & Jean Kovath, The Impact of Legal Counsel on 
Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized 
Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 419, 429 (2001) (finding a correlation between legal 
representation and the likelihood of a favorable judicial outcome). 
 107.  This of course is subject to rules of professional conduct that allow counsel to withdraw if, 
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The United States is liable only to the extent of the VICP trust 
funds.108  As pre-merit-decision interim fees are paid, this leaves less 
money in the trust fund for merit compensation.  Therefore, as this 
Article demonstrates, awarding pre-merit-decision interim fees is 
contrary to the historic norm under the VICP and is deleterious to the 
VICP and those who are to be served by it.  Pre-merit-decision interim 
fee payments therefore need to be stopped. 
D. How We Got Here: The Judicial Genesis of Pre-Merit-Decision 
Interim Fees 
1. Avera v. Secretary of Health & Human Services 
Avera v. Secretary of Health & Human Services is the genesis for 
“interim fees.”109  It is important to note that although Avera used the 
phrase “interim fees,” the VICP uses that term today in a completely 
different way.110  In 2004, the Averas filed a petition on behalf of their 
son, Connor, and alleged that Connor had suffered encephalopathy in 
response to a number of vaccines he received in 2001.111  The petition 
alleged two claims: a table claim and a cause-in-fact claim.112  Petitioners 
later abandoned the table claim but pursued the cause-in-fact claim.113  
Over a year after the petition had been filed, and after several extensions 
from the special master, the Averas finally admitted that they were 
unable to find a validating medical expert opinion to support the cause-
in-fact claim.114  The Averas then requested that the special master render 
a decision based on the then-current state of the medical reports and 
                                                                                                                                  
inter alia, “withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the 
client” or “other good cause for withdrawal exists.”  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.16(b)(1), (7) (2013); see also Lumsden ex rel. Peters v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 97-
0588V, 2012 WL 1357504, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 29, 2012) (examining MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16). 
 108.  See 26 U.S.C. § 9510(d)(1) (2012). 
 109.  515 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 110.  The prime distinction is that the “interim fees” in Avera were still post-merit decision, i.e., 
the special master had already issued a decision on the underlying petition.  This is completely 
different from the practice today in the VICP. 
 111.  Encephalopathy refers to “[a]ny disorder of the brain.”  STEDMAN’S MEDICAL 
DICTIONARY, supra note 27, at 566.  Avera ex rel. Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 
04-1385, 2005 WL 6117662, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 21, 2005). 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
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record.115  On December 21, 2005, the special master held that the 
petitioners were not entitled to compensation under the Act.116 
That was not the end of the case, however.  In February 2006, the 
Averas filed an application for an award of attorneys’ fees.117  The fees 
sought reflected an hourly rate based on Cheyenne, Wyoming, where the 
Averas’ counsel lived and worked.118  The lawyers’ rates per hour were 
$200, $130, and $100, depending on the experience level of the 
particular lawyer.119  But while that fee request was pending, the Averas 
submitted an amended fee petition, which was identical in all respects 
except for the per-hour rates.120  Now counsel sought to apply 
Washington, D.C., rates, using the Laffey Matrix,121 and requested fees 
ranging from $130 to $598 per hour, depending on the lawyer’s 
experience.122 
The special master awarded the fees at the original Cheyenne rates, 
holding that he was bound to follow the “traditional geographic rule” of 
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.123  The Averas filed a motion to vacate 
the special master’s fee decision, again arguing that they were entitled to 
the higher Washington, D.C., rates.124  It was at this point, for the first 
time, that the Averas asserted they were entitled to an award of “interim 
fees” pending appeal.125 
The Averas sought review in the Court of Federal Claims.126  The 
court held that it would be improper to use District of Columbia rates, as 
counsel had little to no actual contact with the District—all of the legal 
services were actually performed in Cheyenne.127  Regarding “interim 
                                                          
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 118.  Id. at 1346. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  The Laffey Matrix is a system used in the District of Columbia to ensure uniform 
determination of fee recoveries in complex federal litigations.  See Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 572 
F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). 
 122.  Avera, 515 F.3d at 1346. 
 123.  Id.; see also Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 04-1385V, 2006 WL 5618158, 
at *2 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 29, 2006) (explaining the “traditional geographic rule”); Rupert ex rel. Rupert v. 
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 52 Fed. Cl. 684, 691 (2002) (noting use of the geographic rate). 
 124.  Avera, 515 F.3d at 1346. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 75 Fed. Cl. 400, 404 (2007). 
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fees” in particular, the court held that “such relief is not authorized by the 
Vaccine Act.”128  The Averas appealed to the Federal Circuit.129 
The first (and primary) issue before the court on appeal was which 
forum rates were appropriate, Cheyenne or Washington, D.C.130  The 
Federal Circuit held that Cheyenne was the appropriate forum because, 
inter alia, that was where the attorneys performed the entirety of their 
work.131  The second (and more important) issue, as framed by the court, 
was “whether the appellants are entitled to an award of interim fees 
pending appeal.”132  The government agreed with both the special master 
and the Court of Federal Claims that the Act made no room for “interim 
fees.”133 
The Federal Circuit first noted that the argument that attorneys’ fees 
were a part of “compensation” under the Act was “rejected” by Saunders 
v. Secretary of Health & Human Services.134  In Saunders, the petitioner 
lost her merit injury claim.135  Instead of accepting the court’s judgment, 
she elected to file a civil suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21(a).136  
After making that election, she nevertheless sought an award of 
attorneys’ fees.137  The government opposed that award on the basis that, 
because she had rejected the court’s judgment under the Act, she was 
precluded from receiving attorneys’ fees.138  The Federal Circuit 
ultimately rejected that argument and held that compensation under the 
Act was not connected to the payment of attorneys’ fees under the Act.139 
Using Saunders for the proposition that attorneys’ fees are not tied to 
“compensation” under the Act, therefore, the Federal Circuit in Avera 
held that “[t]here is nothing in the Vaccine Act that prohibits the award 
of interim fees.”140  The court then looked to other fee-shifting statutes 
                                                          
 128.  Id. at 405. 
 129.  Avera, 515 F.3d at 1347. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 1350. 
 132.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  25 F.3d 1031, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  This decision, too, completely disregards the Act’s 
plain textual reading.  See discussion infra Part IV.B for additional analysis of Saunders. 
 135.  Saunders, 25 F.3d at 1032. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 1033. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. at 1035. 
 140.  Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis 
added).  This line of interpretation equates a lack of a prohibition as a positive grant of authority.  
First, this is a logical fallacy.  Second, this line of argument is particularly specious when the 
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for additional support.141  First, the court examined Bradley v. School 
Board of Richmond, where the Supreme Court construed section 718 of 
Title VII of the Emergency School Aid Act.142  That section provided 
that “[the] court, in its discretion . . . may allow the prevailing party . . . a 
reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .”143  The Supreme Court held such 
language to allow an award of “interim fees” because the failure to do so 
would “work substantial hardship on plaintiffs and their counsel, and 
discourage the institution of actions despite the clear congressional intent 
to the contrary . . . .”144  The Federal Circuit then looked to Hanrahan v. 
Hampton,145 in which the Supreme Court construed 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to 
allow the award of interim fees.146  Because of these cases—in which the 
Supreme Court held that other fee-shifting statutes allow interim fees—
and because the Act does not have a strict prevailing party standard 
(unlike other fee-shifting statutes), the Federal Circuit held that “interim 
fees” are permissible under the Act.147 
Before moving on, it is hugely important to articulate carefully 
exactly what “interim” meant in Avera.  The Avera fees were “interim” 
only in the sense that the merit decision was pending appeal—but there 
was still an initial merit decision by the special master.148  While even 
this definition of “interim” is at odds with the Act, it was unfortunately 
enlarged by subsequent decisions, namely Shaw v. Secretary of Health & 
Human Services.149 
2. Shaw v. Secretary of Health & Human Services 
In Shaw v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the petitioner 
requested “interim” attorneys’ fees before the merit decision on 
compensation had even been issued.150  In 2001, Mr. Shaw filed a 
                                                                                                                                  
government is the paying party due to principles of sovereign immunity.  See discussion infra Part 
III.E (discussing the sovereign immunity implications involved in the VICP). 
 141.  Avera, 515 F.3d at 1351–52. 
 142.  416 U.S. 696 (1974). 
 143.  Id. at 709 n.12. 
 144.  Id. at 723. 
 145.  446 U.S. 754 (1980). 
 146.  Id. at 757–58.  Statute 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides, in part, that “the court, in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of 
the costs . . . .” 
 147.  Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 148.  See id. at 1352. 
 149.  609 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 150.  Id. at 1373. 
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petition under the Act, claiming “that he suffered an inflammatory 
polyneuropathy as a result of the hepatitis B vaccine.”151  Mr. Shaw’s 
case, however, was not the only one alleging an injury related to this 
particular vaccine.152  Consequently, his case was stayed, pending the 
resolution of an omnibus proceeding involving many hepatitis B 
claims.153  Five years later, in 2006, the stay was lifted on Shaw’s case.154 
After the stay was lifted, the special master conducted a merit 
hearing; three witnesses, including an expert, testified.155  After that 
hearing, but before the special master issued his decision on 
compensation, Shaw submitted an “Application for Interim Fees and 
Costs” for $142,778.50 in attorneys’ fees and $32,311.45 in costs.156  The 
government argued that many of the dollar amounts were excessive and 
unreasonable; consequently, the special master awarded Shaw the 
undisputed portion of his request.157  With regard to the disputed portion, 
however, the special master stated that he would revisit the amounts 
when a “final petition for fees and costs is submitted.”158 
Mr. Shaw was not content with that answer, however, and sought 
review with the Court of Federal Claims.159  The Court of Federal Claims 
ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review an interim decision on 
attorneys’ fees.160  The court’s rationale was that, because there had not 
been a final decision on the merits of the petition, there was no 
jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12.161  In other words, the Vaccine 
Act did not allow for interlocutory review of orders.162  On appeal, the 
Federal Circuit disagreed. 
                                                          
 151.  Id.  “Polyneuropathy” refers to “[a] disease process involving a number of peripheral 
nerves.”  STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 27, at 1404. 
 152.  See Shaw, 609 F.3d at 1373. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id.; see also Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 01-707V, 2009 WL 1010058, 
at *1 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 27, 2009). 
 157.  Shaw, 609 F.3d at 1373 (quoting Shaw, 2009 WL 1010058, at *2–3). 
 158.  Id. (quoting Shaw, 2009 WL 1010058, at *3). 
 159.  Id. at 1374. 
 160.  Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 88 Fed. Cl. 463, 466 (2009), rev’d, 609 F.3d 
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 161.  Id. at 465. 
 162.  See, e.g., Widdoss v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 989 F.2d 1170, 1175–76 (Fed. Cir. 
1993); Weiss v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 59 Fed. Cl. 624, 627 (2004); Lemire v. Sec’y of 
Health & Human Servs., 60 Fed. Cl. 75, 79–80 (2004); Spratling v. Sec’y of Health & Human 
Servs., 37 Fed. Cl. 202, 203–04 (1997). 
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The Federal Circuit held that the special master’s granting or 
denying of interim attorneys’ fees is a “decision on compensation” and is 
thus reviewable.163  For its authority, the court cited 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-
12, which includes in the statutory definition of “compensation” an 
amount for attorneys’ fees and costs.164  The court then explained that 
“the Vaccine Act uses the term compensation to refer both to 
compensatory damages (such as payment for injury) and attorneys’ fees 
and costs.”165  The court held therefore that a decision on pre-merit-
decision interim fees is a decision on “compensation” and is thus 
reviewable by the Court of Federal Claims without any merit decision.166 
E. The “Standard” Used to Grant Pre-Merit-Decision Interim Fees 
Now that Avera and Shaw, construed together, allow for the granting 
of pre-merit-decision interim fees, the hotly litigated issue (and the 
second major problem with the VICP’s current practice) has become the 
standard that should be used in determining whether to grant pre-merit-
decision interim fees in a particular case.  Naturally, if a petition is 
successful, attorneys’ fees and costs are automatically included in the 
award by statute.  If, however, the petitioner is not successful, the special 
master may award fees if the petition “was brought in good faith and 
there was a reasonable basis for the claim . . . .”167  The reasonable basis 
and good faith standard, not surprisingly, has been adopted as the interim 
fee standard.168  In practice, though, this standard has not been a real 
standard at all—based on the case law, there appears to be a de facto 
granting of pre-merit-decision interim fees.169 
                                                          
 163.  Shaw, 609 F.3d at 1376 (emphasis added).  Note how the Federal Circuit fails to reconcile 
this with its rationale in Avera that attorneys’ fees are not compensation for purposes of timing but 
are compensation for purposes of appellate review. 
 164.  Id. at 1375. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. at 1376.  As discussed infra Part IV.A, however, Shaw completely ignores the 
surrounding statutory text and the operation of the Act as a whole. 
 167.  42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1) (2012). 
 168.  See, e.g., McKellar v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 101 Fed. Cl. 297, 301 (2011) 
(stating that a showing of good faith and reasonable basis are necessary but not sufficient for an 
interim fee award). 
 169.  See, e.g., McKellar v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 09-841V, 2011 WL 3425606, 
at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 3, 2011) (“Traditionally, special masters have been ‘quite generous 
in finding a reasonable basis for petitioners.’” (quoting Turner v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
No. 99-544V, 2007 WL 4410030, at *8 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 30, 2007), rev’d, 101 Fed. Cl. 
297 (2011))).  In fairness, there are cases where the special master has denied interim fees, both in 
the pre- and post-merit context.  This can happen for three reasons.  First, the case did not have a 
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This has caused tension between the Office of Special Masters and 
the Court of Federal Claims judges, as there is divergence in both levels 
of the court.  A prime case typifying this problem is McKellar v. 
Secretary of Health & Human Services.170 
In McKellar, the petitioner alleged that the human papillomavirus 
(HPV) and menactra, varicella, tetanus-diphteria-acellular-pertussis 
(Tdap) vaccines caused fever, difficulty swallowing, oral blisters, and 
other miscellaneous maladies.171  Petitioner’s counsel compiled 400 
pages of medical records.172  Although the underlying merit decision had 
not been reached, counsel submitted an application for interim attorneys’ 
fees for roughly $18,000.173  After submitting the fee application, counsel 
notified the special master that he would be withdrawing as counsel of 
record, and thus labeled the fee requests as “final” requests.174  In sum, 
there had been no decision on the merits, but counsel wanted out and 
wanted to be paid first. 
Citing Avera and using the standard of good faith and reasonable 
basis, the special master granted the fees175—despite the fact that the 
special master expressly stated in her opinion that, “Petitioner’s medical 
records disclosed no evidence of a valid claim for compensation . . . .”176  
To find good faith, the special master held that good faith is generally 
presumed.177  Moreover, according to the special master, this good faith 
inquiry is subjective in nature.178 
Regarding the reasonable basis element, the special master noted that 
traditionally special masters have been “‘quite generous in finding a 
                                                                                                                                  
reasonable basis from the outset.  Second, the case was not filed in good faith.  Third, some special 
masters are following Judge Bruggink’s McKellar decision, in which he held that interim fees should 
not be the norm, rather they should be only for certain limited circumstances; for example, when 
there has been protracted litigation.  See McKellar, 101 Fed. Cl. at 301 (holding that “some special 
showing is necessary to warrant interim fees, including but not limited to the delineated factors of 
protracted proceedings, costly experts, or undue hardship”); see also infra notes 155–58 and 
accompanying text.  Some special masters have adopted Judge Bruggink’s approach.  E.g., 
Heinzelman v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 07-01V, 2012 WL 1119389, at *3–4 (Fed. Cl. 
Spec. Mstr. Mar. 13, 2012). 
 170.  101 Fed. Cl. 297 (2011). 
 171.  Id. at 298–99. 
 172.  Id. at 298. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  See McKellar v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 09-841V, 2011 WL 3425606, at *2 
(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 3, 2011), rev’d, 101 Fed. Cl. 297 (2011). 
 176.  Id. at *1. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
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reasonable basis for petitioners.’”179  Even though the special master 
noted that not all the medical records had been collected, and even 
though “[t]he citations to the medical records may have been incomplete 
and taken out of context,” the special master still held that there was a 
reasonable basis to file the petition.180  This is despite the fact that the 
only evidence of any vaccine injury was the patient’s own statement to 
her doctor to the effect that the vaccine caused the blisters and an 
anonymous VAERS report,181 which could have also been filed by the 
petitioner.  Basically, the only evidence consisted of self-serving 
statements made by the petitioner.  Nevertheless, the special master cut 
the withdrawing counsel a check.182 
What we can draw from this is that attorneys’ fees and costs are 
almost a sure thing in many cases, even though most cases go on to be 
                                                          
 179.  Id. at *2 (quoting Turner v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-544V, 2007 WL 
4410030, *8 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 30, 2007)). 
 180.  Id. at *3.  Fortunately, Judge Bruggink, upon review, reversed this decision of the special 
master on the grounds that the special master conflated the tests of good faith and reasonable basis.  
McKellar v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 101 Fed. Cl. 297, 305 (2011).  But, the decision of the 
special master is nevertheless illustrative of the problems with the current interpretation of the Act.  
The current trend is to equivocate “reasonable basis” with meaning “not frivolous.”  See, e.g., 
Perreira v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 35 (1992).  Other commentators have 
lamented at this all too flexible standard.  E.g., Boxler, supra note 12, at 20–22 (discussing the 
subjective and low hurdle of good faith and easily satisfied reasonable basis elements).  On 
remand—even after Judge Bruggink’s first McKellar opinion—the special master still awarded 
attorneys’ fees and costs.  McKellar v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 09-841V, 2012 WL 
362030 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 13, 2012), rev’d, 2012 WL 1884703 (Fed. Cl. May 3, 2012).  On 
review, yet again, Judge Bruggink held as a matter of law that interim fees were not appropriate.  See 
McKellar v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 09-841V, 2012 WL 1884703 (Fed. Cl. May 3, 
2012).  The multiple iterations of back and forth in McKellar on interim fees is entirely 
representative of the problem that pre-merit-decision interim fees and the associated moral hazard 
problem is clogging the Court of Federal Claims’ docket. 
 181.  “The Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) is a national vaccine safety 
surveillance program co-sponsored by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).”  Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://vaers.hhs.gov/index (last visited Oct. 28, 2014).  
Anybody can file a VAERS report, and “VAERS seeks reports of any clinically significant medical 
event that occurs after vaccination, even if the reporter cannot be certain that the event was caused 
by the vaccine.”  VAERS Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
http://vaers.hhs.gov/about/faqs (last visited Oct. 28, 2014).  As Judge Bruggink noted, “[w]hile 
VAERS data may be useful to scientific researchers, the purpose of a VAERS report is not to 
establish causal connection, or any connection for that matter, between a vaccine and subsequent 
maladies.”  McKellar v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 101 Fed. Cl. 297, 304 (2011).  The Court 
of Federal Claims has been reluctant to rely on such reports.  See id. at 304; see also Ryman v. Sec’y 
of Health & Human Servs., 65 Fed. Cl. 35, 39–40 (2005); Capizzano v. Sec’y of Health & Human 
Servs., 63 Fed. Cl. 227, 231 (2004), vacated on other grounds, 440 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006); 
Manville v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 63 Fed. Cl. 482, 494 (2004). 
 182.  See supra note 181 (noting Judge Bruggink’s reversal of the special master). 
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dismissed.183  Under the current state of the VICP, it seems that for there 
not to be good faith or a reasonable basis, there must be actual 
knowledge that the claim is frivolous.184  For example, in Perreira v. 
Secretary of Health & Human Services, the special master used a 
“patently unreasonable” standard in adjudging the attorneys’ fees 
award.185  In Grice v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the court 
required a showing of “direct evidence of bad faith . . . .”186  In Jessen v. 
Secretary of Health & Human Services, the special master expressly 
declined to adopt a “very strict” interpretation of reasonable basis and 
instead noted that attorneys’ fees and costs are denied “[i]n situations 
where truly there existed no logical basis for the claim . . . .”187  There 
have even been attorneys’ fees awards when the petition did not include 
specific vaccination records.188  In sum, the standard has become far too 
lawyer-friendly. 
IV. BEDROCK PRINCIPLES AND CANONS OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION PRECLUDE AN AWARD OF PRE-MERIT-DECISION 
INTERIM FEES 
The solution to the problem is a simple one: proper statutory 
construction.  The statute, properly construed, does not allow for any 
award of fees or costs before a decision on the underlying merits.  
Ultimately, this is a question of how the Act defines the term 
“compensation,” what that term includes, and when compensation is 
available for a petitioner.  While courts have not favored this result as a 
matter of policy, it is not within the jurisdiction of any court to make 
vaccine policy from the bench.  The court’s job—in fact, its duty—is to 
                                                          
 183.  VICP Statistics, supra note 79.  For example, in fiscal year 2011, 261 petitions were paid 
merit compensation, while 1,371 were dismissed.  Id.  In fiscal year 2012, 260 petitions were paid 
merit compensation, while 2,439 petitions were dismissed.  Id.  While cases are not normally 
adjudicated in the same fiscal year as they were filed, these numbers nevertheless show that more 
petitions are dismissed in any year than paid merit compensation. 
 184.  This is bolstered by the special master’s decision which noted that the Secretary, in 
opposition, did not “[present] any facts that addressed the state of mind of the Petitioner.”  McKellar 
v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 09-841V, 2011 WL 3425606 at *1 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. 
June 3, 2011). 
 185.  No. 90-847V, 1992 WL 164436, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 12, 1992). 
 186.  36 Fed. Cl. 114, 121 (1996). 
 187.  No. 94-1029V, 1997 WL 48940, at *1, *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 17, 1997). 
 188.  See Melbourne v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-694V, 2007 WL 2020084 (Fed. 
Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 25, 2007).  But see Brown ex rel. Brown v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
No. 99-539, 2005 WL 1026713, at *2–3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 11, 2005). 
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interpret the plain language of the text.  If Congress does not like that 
result, insofar as it affects the efficacy of the VICP, Congress alone has 
the constitutional authority to change the Act. 
The goal of any jurist, in construing a statute, is to “[give] effect to 
the text that the lawmakers have adopted.”189  According to Holmes, a 
judge “[does] not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what 
the statute means.”190  As deftly stated by Justice Marshall: 
[T]he intention of the instrument must prevail; that this intention must 
be collected from its words; that its words are to be understood in that 
sense in which they are generally used by those for whom the 
instrument was intended; that its provisions are neither to be restricted 
into insignificance, nor extended to objects not comprehended in them, 
nor contemplated by its framers . . . .191 
Consequently, Anglo-American law has developed principles of 
interpretation that seek to guide the interpreter to a fair reading of the 
text.192  By using these principles, the current problematic interim fee 
debacle would have been avoided. 
A. Supremacy of Text and the Whole-Text Canon 
Broadly speaking, the most fundamental principle that is lacking in 
interim fee jurisprudence is the supremacy of text principle.193  This 
principle provides that “[t]he words of a governing text are of paramount 
concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text 
means.”194  This tradition is found in antiquity; as Justinian phrased it, “A 
verbis legis non est recedendum,” or “Do not depart from the words of 
the law.”195  This principle can be found in many opinions, expressed by 
                                                          
 189.  See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 29 (2012). 
 190.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 
(1899). 
 191.  Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 332 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 192.  See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 189, at xxvii.  By “fair reading,” Scalia and 
Garner advance “determining the application of a governing text to given facts on the basis of how a 
reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text at the time it was 
issued.”  Id. at 33. 
 193.  See id. at 56. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id.; see also State ex rel. Dowling v. Butts, 149 So. 746, 757 (Fla. 1933) (‘“[T]hat they 
ought not to make any construction against the express letter of the statute; for nothing can so 
express the meaning of the makers of the act as their own direct words, for “index animi sermo.” 
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the words, “If the language is clear and unambiguous, judicial inquiry is 
at an end in all but the most extraordinary circumstances, and the court 
must give effect to the clear meaning of the statute as written.”196 
Seeking to effectuate this principle, courts have adopted canons to 
aid in the interpretive process.  The first canon applicable here is the 
“whole-text canon.”197  As the name implies, this principle provides 
simply that the text (here, the Act) must be construed as a whole.  As 
stated by Justice Kennedy, “In ascertaining the plain meaning of [a] 
statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, 
as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.”198 
This canon includes more than just considering every word of a 
statute; it requires the court to consider the text “in view of its structure 
and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts.”199  As Sir 
Edward Coke wrote, “[I]t is the most natural and genuine exposition of a 
statute to construe one part of the statute by another part of the same 
statute, for that best expresseth the meaning of the makers.”200 
The text, organization, and structure of the Vaccine Act preclude an 
interpretation that allows pre-merit-decision interim fees.  The problem 
with Avera, Shaw, and their progeny is that they treat the word 
                                                                                                                                  
And it would be dangerous to give scope to make a construction in any case against the express 
words, when the meaning of the makers doth not appear to the contrary, and when no inconvenience 
will thereupon follow; and therefore in such cases ‘a verbis legis non est recedendum.’”) (Ellis, J., 
concurring) (quoting Edrich’s Case, (1907) 77 Eng. Rep. 238 (K.B.) 239; 5 Co. Rep. 118a, 118b); 
Macon & A.R. Co. v. Macon & D.R. Co., 13 S.E. 157, 158 (Ga. 1890) (“The words are to receive 
their plain and obvious import; and we think the maxim a verbis legis non est recedendum, applies in 
this case.”). 
 196.  Quiles Rodriguez v. Calderon, 172 F. Supp. 2d 334, 339 (D.P.R. 2001); see also Estate of 
Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 (1992) (“The controlling principle in this case is 
the basic and unexceptional rule that courts must give effect to the clear meaning of statutes as 
written.”); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (“When the Court finds the 
statutory language to be unambiguous, its clear meaning is controlling and the Court does not need 
to refer to any other source to interpret its meaning.”). 
 197.  See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 189, at 167. 
 198.  K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988); see also Bethesda Hosp. Ass’n v. 
Bowen, 485 U.S. 399 (1988) (examining the “language and design of the statute as a whole”); 
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 221 (1986) (evaluating a statute “in light of the 
language of the Act as a whole”); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956) (“‘In 
expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look 
to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’” (quoting United States v. Heirs of 
Boisdoré, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1849))). 
 199.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 189, at 167.  Moreover, Coke also noted that, “If any 
section [of a law] be intricate, obscure, or doubtful, the proper mode of discovering its true meaning 
is by comparing it with other sections, and finding out the sense of one clause by the words or 
obvious intent of the other.”  Id. at 167 n.2. 
 200.  Id. at 167 n.1. 
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“compensation” myopically, failing to see the interrelatedness of the 
phrase “compensation” as used elsewhere in the Act.  The term 
“compensation” is used many times in the Act, and the whole-text canon 
dictates that we must consider how the word “compensation” is used 
throughout the Act as a whole.  Section 11 of the Act provides that a 
proceeding for “compensation” is commenced by serving a petition with 
the Court of Federal Claims.201  Section 13 provides that “compensation” 
shall be awarded under the VICP if certain requirements are satisfied.202  
Finally, § 15 defines what constitutes “compensation” under the Act.203  
We must examine how these provisions work together. 
Under § 15, there are two ways—and two ways only—that 
compensation can be paid: (1) if the petitioner is successful on the merits 
and § 15(a) therefore operates to pay the statutory components of 
“compensation,” including attorneys’ fees, or (2) if the petitioner is not 
successful on the merits, thereby triggering the discretionary payment of 
“compensation” under § 15(e)(1)(B) if the petition was brought in good 
faith and possessed a reasonable basis.204 
Let’s examine the actual language contained in § 15(e)(1)(B): 
If the judgment of the United States Court of Federal Claims on such a 
petition does not award compensation, the special master or court may 
award an amount of compensation to cover petitioner’s reasonable 
attorneys’ fees and other costs incurred in any proceeding on such 
petition if the special master or court determines that the petition was 
brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim for 
which the petition was brought.205 
Plainly, the payment of compensation, including attorneys’ fees, in 
an unsuccessful petition is purely discretionary.  Although courts agree 
on this, they have radically and intentionally departed from the text on 
the required triggering condition that allows the court to make that 
discretionary decision on interim fees. 
Examining the plain text of the statute—and how the statute as a 
whole operates—the answer should be evident: it requires a merit 
decision on the petition.  Supporting this conclusion is the use of the 
word “judgment” and the phrase “judgment . . . on such a petition does 
                                                          
 201.  42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a) (2012). 
 202.  Id. § 300aa-13. 
 203.  Id. § 300aa-15. 
 204.  Id. § 300aa-15(e)(1)(A)–(B). 
 205.  Id. § 300aa-15(e)(1) (flush language) (emphasis added). 
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not award compensation.”206  The term “judgment” is used other places 
in the Act.  Section 12, which concerns the court’s jurisdiction over 
petitions, is the operating section regarding “judgments” entered in the 
VICP.  Section 12(e)(3) provides how and when a “judgment” is entered 
with respect to a petition.207  A judgment is entered if a party does not 
request a motion for review of the special master’s decision, or if such a 
motion is filed and the court sustains the special master’s decision.208  
Both situations contemplate a decision on the merits of compensation.  In 
sum, there can be no judgment and therefore no “compensation” awarded 
until an actual judicial determination has been made regarding the 
petition’s merits. 
This conclusion is bolstered further by the next phrase in § 
15(e)(1)(B), “on such a petition does not award compensation.”  The 
phrase is modifying the term “judgment.”  The whole structure of the 
Act, moreover, is directed at the Court of Federal Claims to issue a 
decision (read: judgment) on the petition regarding compensation.  
Without this critical decision regarding compensation (i.e., the 
judgment), the discretionary aspect of compensation—including 
attorneys’ fees and costs—is never triggered statutorily.  Failing to see 
how compensation is tied to the other sections abandons the whole-text 
canon. 
In addition, this interpretation also comports with congressional 
intent.  In 1989, the Act was amended.209  The amendments changed the 
exact source of the confusion here, i.e., § 15(e)(1).  The stated purpose of 
the amendments was “to clarify that the special master’s or Claims Court 
award for amounts to cover attorney’s fees and costs is to be included 
after proceedings are complete.”210  The statute’s text and the legislative 
history are abundantly clear. 
                                                          
 206.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 207.  Id. § 300aa-12(e)(3), in full, states: “In the absence of a motion under paragraph (1) 
respecting the special master’s decision or if the United States Court of Federal Claims takes the 
action described in paragraph (2)(A) with respect to the special master’s decision, the clerk of the 
United States Court of Federal Claims shall immediately enter judgment in accordance with the 
special master’s decision.” 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 
(1989). 
 210.  H.R. REP. NO. 101-386, at 517 (1989) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N 3018, 
3120. 
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B. Definitional Sections Are to Be Carefully Followed and Used 
Consistently 
Statutes often contain discrete definition sections,211 or specifically 
define terms in a particular subsection for use in that subsection.212  
Definition sections can also be used to give an artificial or special 
meaning to a word that already has an ordinary, commonly accepted 
meaning.213  Section 15 of the Vaccine Act does exactly that: it gives a 
specific meaning to the word “compensation” as used throughout the 
Act.  Section 15 of the Act provides that “compensation” awarded under 
the VICP “shall include” a statutory list of damages, including 
unreimbursed expenses, diminished loss of earnings, pain and suffering, 
and, if a death resulted, a death payout.214  It is within this statutory 
definition of compensation—and in this section only—that fee shifting is 
involved.  In other words, attorneys’ fees are tied directly to the term 
“compensation” under the Act.  In fact, the attorneys’ fees in a successful 
merits case “shall also [be awarded] as part of such compensation.”215  
Attorneys’ fees under the Act are therefore inextricably tied and related 
to compensation.  Under the transitive principle, therefore, any condition 
precedent to compensation awarded under the Act must also be a 
condition precedent to any payment of attorneys’ fees or costs.216  The 
current interpretation of the Act, however, completely disregards the 
transitive nature and definitional use of “compensation” in the Act. 
The Federal Circuit had occasion to discuss the operation of § 15 and 
compensation in Saunders v. Secretary of Health & Human Services.217  
In Saunders, the petitioner alleged that her son suffered permanently 
from seizures due to the DPT vaccine her son received.218  The special 
master denied compensation and held that the petitioner failed to show 
                                                          
 211.  E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining bankruptcy terms). 
 212.  This practice is common in the Internal Revenue Code.  See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 117(b)(1) 
(2012) (defining “qualified scholarship”). 
 213.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 189, at 225. 
 214.  42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15 (2012); see also supra Part II.B. (expounding upon the types of 
compensation payouts under the Act). 
 215.  Id. § 300aa-15(e) (emphasis added). 
 216.  The transitive principle is a mathematical and logical rule that provides if A bears some 
relation to B, and B bears that same relation to C, then A bears it to C.  In mathematical terms, if A = 
B, and B = C, then A = C.  See, e.g., DEREK HAYLOCK & FIONA THANGATA, KEY CONCEPTS IN 
TEACHING PRIMARY MATHEMATICS 173 (2007). 
 217.  25 F.3d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 218.  Id. at 1032. 
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by a preponderance of the evidence that the DPT vaccine was the cause 
in fact.219  Petitioner did not seek review in the Court of Federal Claims 
and the court therefore entered judgment and dismissed the petition.220 
Four months after the judgment and dismissal, petitioner sought a 
payment of attorneys’ fees and costs under § 15, which allows payment 
of fees and costs even if merit compensation is not awarded.221  The 
government opposed the application, arguing that the award was 
prohibited as a matter of law because the petitioner rejected the court’s 
judgment,222 which, according to the government, precluded any 
subsequent judgment awarding attorneys’ fees.  The special master, over 
the government’s objection, awarded fees and costs in part.223 
On review at the Court of Federal Claims, the government argued 
that the election contained in § 21 is an “acceptance or rejection of all the 
compensation, including attorneys’ fees and costs, to which a claimant 
might be found entitled under the Act.”224  Also pointing to § 15, the 
government argued that compensation includes attorneys’ fees and 
costs.225  Thus, when taken together, any payment of compensation (i.e., 
attorneys’ fees) is not allowed after an election has been formally made 
to reject the merit judgment compensation.226  The court noted that the 
government’s argument “has the force of plain language behind it.”227  
Nevertheless, the court ultimately affirmed the special master’s award.228  
It held that § 15(e)(1) “is most reasonably read as permitting all 
allowable elements of compensation to be addressed in a single award 
rather than as requiring all such elements to be addressed in a single 
award.”229  The government appealed to the Federal Circuit. 
On appeal, the issue was the operation of § 15(f)(1), which provides, 
in part, “no compensation may be paid until an election has been made, 
                                                          
 219.  Id.; see also Saunders v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 90-826V, 1992 WL 700268 
(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 26, 1992). 
 220.  Saunders, 25 F.3d at 1032. 
 221.  Id. at 1033. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Id.  The special master did not award fees for petitioner’s expert witness due to lack of 
substantiating documentation.  See Saunders v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 26 Cl. Ct. 1221, 
1223 (1992). 
 224.  Saunders, 26 Cl. Ct. at 1223. 
 225.  Id. at 1224. 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Id. at 1227. 
 229.  Id. at 1225. 
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or has been deemed to have been made, under [§ 21(a)] of this title to 
receive compensation.”230  Section 21(a) provides that after judgment has 
been entered by the court, the petitioner must elect one of two options.231  
The first option, which applies only if compensation was awarded, is an 
election to receive the compensation or to file a civil action for 
damages.232  The second option, if the judgment did not award 
compensation, is an election to accept the judgment or to file a civil 
action for damages.233  Therefore, under both options the petitioner must 
choose whether he or she will accept the judgment of the court or will 
proceed with a civil action in a different court.  If the petitioner does not 
file the written election, the statute deems the petitioner to have elected 
to accept the judgment of the court (thereby barring a subsequent civil 
suit).234 
The parties did not dispute that Saunders’ petition was brought in 
good faith and had a reasonable basis.235  Rather, the government argued 
that unless the judgment was accepted under § 15(f)(1), no payment 
could be triggered under the Act.236  Similar to the argument made in this 
Article, the government contended that “compensation” under the Act 
included both merit compensation, if any, and the payment of attorneys’ 
fees.237 
In interpreting § 15, the Federal Circuit stated that “the term 
‘compensation’ is used mainly in the Vaccine Act to mean payment for 
expenses incurred and losses suffered as a result of the administration of 
a vaccine,”238 and that “the primary focus of the term ‘compensation’ is 
upon payment for expenses incurred and losses suffered from the 
administration of a vaccine, rather than upon recovery of attorneys’ fees 
and costs incurred in court proceedings under the [VICP].”239  Both of 
these statements, although true, ignore the special operation of § 15 as a 
definition section with a transitive effect.  The purpose of § 15 is to 
define the use of the word “compensation” within the meaning of the 
                                                          
 230.  42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(f)(1) (2012). 
 231.  Id. § 300aa-21(a). 
 232.  Id. § 300aa-21(a)(1). 
 233.  Id. § 300aa-21(a)(2). 
 234.  Id. § 300aa-21(a). 
 235.  Saunders v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 1032, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Id.  Although this contention is true, the government took this line of reasoning too far. 
 238.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 239.  Id. at 1035 (emphasis added). 
TODD GALLEY TODD VACCINE ACT_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/11/2014  9:47 AM 
34 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
Act—i.e., to delineate what is includable in a “compensation” payment.  
Moreover, because the Act adds attorneys’ fees to the concept of 
compensation, which is contrary to the “American rule” of attorneys’ 
fees generally,240 it is even more imperative to abide by the definitional 
aspect of § 15. 
The Federal Circuit then noted the principle that it has to give 
meaning and effect to all provisions of the Act.241  According to the 
court, adopting the government’s position would not accord with this 
principle of statutory construction because the position would result in a 
purported internal inconsistency.242  Under the court’s reasoning, that 
inconsistency would be in § 15, which notes that if the special master 
does not award compensation, it can award an amount of compensation 
to cover attorneys’ fees and costs.243  Presumably, the court is referring to 
the perceived conflict when a court will not award compensation with 
one hand, and yet will with the other hand.  To reconcile this perceived 
“conflict,” the two “compensation” terms in the different sections, 
according to the court, must be referring to two different things—one is 
merit compensation and the other is attorneys’ fees and costs.244  Thus, 
because compensation can mean two different things in § 15, there’s no 
reason why it cannot be referring to two different things in § 21.245  Here, 
the court was in the right church but wrong pew. 
By holding that attorneys’ fees are completely unhinged from 
compensation as used in § 15(f)(1) and § 21(a), they have become 
unhinged in all other sections of the Act, including the timing provisions, 
which eventually gave rise to pre-merit-decision interim fees.  There is a 
better way to reconcile the perceived conflict, however, and that is to 
recognize that the term “compensation,” as used in the Act, is an 
umbrella term that has two constituent parts: (a) compensatory damages 
                                                          
 240.  Henry F. Minnerop & Kimberly A. Johns, Attorneys’ Fees in Arbitration, 61 BUS. LAW. 
589, 589–90 (2006) (“It is a long-standing principle of American law, the American Rule, that a 
prevailing party in a litigation is not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees except (i) where 
authorized by statute, (ii) where the parties have agreed that the prevailing party should be awarded 
attorneys’ fees, or (iii) where the court concludes that one of the litigants has acted in bad faith.”); 
Johnny Parker, The Common Fund Doctrine: Coming of Age in the Law of Insurance Subrogation, 
31 IND. L. REV. 313, 313 (1998) (“Pursuant to the ‘American Rule,’ each party is obligated to pay its 
own attorney’s fees, regardless of the outcome of the litigation.”). 
 241.  Saunders, 25 F.3d at 1035. 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1)(B) (2012). 
 244.  Saunders, 25 F.3d at 1035. 
 245.  Id. 
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and (b) attorneys’ fees and costs.  Therefore, while compensatory 
damages and attorneys’ fees are distinct, they are treated similarly with 
regard to other provisions of the Act.  In other words, although the court 
does not award one type of compensation, it can still award another type 
(subset) of compensation, but both are still “compensation” with regard 
to the timing and judgment restrictions the Act applies to that term.  In 
sum, those conditions elsewhere in the Act apply to any compensation—
whether it is compensatory damages or attorneys’ fees compensation.  
Moreover, this interpretation better accords with the text immediately 
surrounding the § 15(e)(1) block text, which refers to “the judgment” not 
awarding compensation (timing provision, i.e., post-merit decision). 
C. Casus Omissus Pro Omisso Habendus Est 
The canon of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est provides that a 
court should not add to what the text states or reasonably implies.246  As 
Justice Blackmun noted in construing the Securities Exchange Act, “[I]f 
the Congress [had] intended to provide additional exceptions, it would 
have done so in clear language . . . .”247  Justice Louis Brandeis said, 
similarly, “A casus omissus does not justify judicial legislation.”248  As 
elucidated by Justice Buller: 
                                                          
 246.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 189, at 93; see also Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 
U.S. 122, 135 (1988) (“Neither can this Court supply a casus omissus in a treaty, any more than in a 
law.  We are to find out the intention of the parties by just rules of interpretation applied to the 
subject matter; and having found that, our duty is to follow it as far as it goes, and to stop where that 
stops—whatever may be the imperfections or difficulties which it leaves behind.” (quoting In re The 
Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. 1, 71 (1821))); United States ex rel. Coy v. United States, 316 U.S. 342, 
345 (1942) (finding that failure of a criminal procedural rule to provide for appeals of orders from 
the district court was a casus omissus which left a prior rule in force); United States v. Union P. 
R.R., 91 U.S. 72, 86 (1875) (“I venture to lay it down as a general rule respecting the interpretation 
of deeds, that all latitude of construction must submit to this restriction; namely, that the words may 
bear the sense which by construction is put upon them. If we step beyond this line, we no longer 
construe men’s deeds, but make deeds for them.” (quoting Gibson v. Minet, (1791) 126 Eng. Rep. 
326, 352; 1 H. BL. 569, 615)); Bailey v. Kain, 192 N.E.2d 486, 490–91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1963) (“That 
which the legislature has omitted through oversight, inadvertence or otherwise is a casus omissus 
and falls within the legal maxim of ‘Casus Omissus Pro Omisso Habendus Est.,’ (a case omitted is 
to be held as intentionally omitted).” (quoting TRAYNOR, LEGAL MAXIMS 67)); State v. Crenshaw, 
35 So. 456, 456 (1903) (“‘It was a maxim of the old law that casus omissus pro omisso habendus est, 
that is, that a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted, . . . and so, not to have been omitted 
merely by inadvertence or accident; still the courts are not at liberty to add to the language of the 
law; and it must be held that the Legislature intended to omit the specific case, however that may 
appear in connection with the general passage of the statute.’” (quoting HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, 
HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 57–58 (1896))). 
 247.  Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 538 (8th Cir. 1966) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 248.  Ebert v. Poston, 266 U.S. 548, 554 (1925). 
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We are bound . . . to take the act of Parliament as they have made it: a 
casus omissus can in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that 
would be to make laws; nor can I conceive that it is our province to 
consider whether such a law that has been passed be tyrannical or 
not.249 
Under § 15(e), there is simply no exception to the textual 
requirement of a predicate merit judgment being needed to award any 
attorneys’ fees or costs.  The court cannot unilaterally carve out an 
exception, even with the best of intentions—and even if it would be 
“better” policy.  To do so, in the words of Justice Brandeis, “transcends 
the judicial function.”250 
D. Remedial Statutes Are Not to Be Liberally Construed in 
Contravention of the Text 
A common refrain in judicial opinions, including even those 
involving the Vaccine Act,251 is that “remedial” statutes are to be 
liberally construed.252  Because the Vaccine Act is a remedial statute 
(i.e., to make injured persons whole), the theory goes, it should be 
construed broadly and liberally.253  This rationale, in part, led to the 
absurdity in Shaw—contrary to the plain text of § 15—that attorneys’ 
                                                          
 249.  United States v. Union P. R.R., 91 U.S. 72, 85 (1875) (quoting Jones v. Smart, (1785) 99 
Eng. Rep. 963, 967; 1 T.R. 44). 
 250.  Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926). 
 251.  See, e.g., Cloer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 675 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(en banc), aff’d sub nom. Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S.Ct. 1886 (2013) (“Remedial legislation like the 
Vaccine Act should be construed in a manner that effectuates its underlying spirit and purpose.”); 
Zatuchni ex rel. Estate of Snyder v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 73 Fed. Cl. 451, 458 (2006), 
aff’d sub nom. Zatuchni v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 516 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“Where, however, jurisdictional prerequisites are satisfied, as they are in this case, the Vaccine Act 
ought to then be interpreted by a plain reading of its terms, mindful of the Act’s remedial intent.”); 
Rooks v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 35 Fed. Cl. 1, 8 (1996) (“By presuming that the Act only 
provides for direct administrative situations and, thus, excluding in utero situations, the remedial 
purpose of compensating vaccine-related injuries would be thwarted.”); Schultz v. Sec’y of Health & 
Human Servs., No. 12-234V, 2013 WL 5314595, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 30, 2013) 
(“Because it is a broad remedial statute, the Vaccine Act and its provisions are to be construed in a 
manner that effectuates that underlying spirit and purpose.”); Burch v. Sec’y of Health & Human 
Servs., No. 99-946V, 2010 WL 1676767, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 9, 2010) (“[W]ith respect 
to interpretations of the Vaccine Act, which clearly is a ‘remedial’ statute, the sovereign immunity 
canon of ‘strict construction’ is, in effect, ‘offset’ by the competing statutory construction principle 
of ‘liberal construction’ of remedial statutes . . . .”). 
 252.  See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562 (1987); Urie v. 
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 181–82, 182 n.20 (1949). 
 253.  This of course is completely antithetical to the principle of narrowly construing waivers of 
sovereign immunity.  See infra Part IV.E. 
TODD VACCINE ACT_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/11/2014  9:47 AM 
2014] THE TAIL THAT WAGS THE DOG 37 
fees could be paid even before a judgment is entered.  Explaining its 
rationale in Shaw, the court noted “one of the underlying purposes of the 
Vaccine Act was to ensure that vaccine injury claimants have readily 
available a competent bar to prosecute their claims . . . .  Denying interim 
fee awards would clearly make it more difficult for claimants to secure 
competent counsel.”254 
Using this paradigm invariably leads to a purposive interpretation 
instead of a textual, fair-reading interpretation of a statute.255  Even if the 
Federal Circuit’s concern about the vaccine bar is true—and the court 
cites no evidence that the quality of the bar is in jeopardy—that is a 
prudential (policy) decision that needs to be remedied by Congress, not 
the judiciary.256  When the judiciary makes such decisions, in 
contravention of the statute’s text, it leads to an improper and 
unconstitutional usurpation of legislative power by the judiciary to make 
the law “what it should be” in the eyes of the judge.257  As eloquently 
stated by the Supreme Court in Crooks v. Harrelson, “Laws enacted with 
good intention, when put to the test, frequently, and to the surprise of the 
lawmaker himself, turn out to be mischievous, absurd, or otherwise 
objectionable.  But in such case the remedy lies with the lawmaking 
authority, and not with the courts.”258 
                                                          
 254.  Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 609 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 255.  A purposive interpretation is unhinged from the text and seeks to achieve what, in the 
judge’s opinion, was the purpose of the law.  Invariably, this leads to a judge-by-judge determination 
of what the law is and thus leads to an unpredictable and inherently discriminatory jurisprudence.  
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 189, at 16–19; see also WILLIAM D. POPKIN, A DICTIONARY OF 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 105, 222 (2007). 
 256.  See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Marbury v. Madison and the Foundation of Law, 4 LIBERTY 
U. L. REV. 297, 329 (2010) (noting that legislative power is prudential in nature, i.e., forward 
looking, whereas judicial power is not concerned with achieving some future objective). 
 257.  See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481 (2010) (“We will not rewrite a law to 
conform it to constitutional requirements, for doing so would constitute a serious invasion of the 
legislative domain.”) (internal quotation and citations omitted); I.C.C. v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 467 
U.S. 354, 379 (1984) (O’Connor, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (“[T]his Court is no 
more authorized than is the Commission to rewrite the law.”); Elec. Storage Battery Co. v. 
Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 14 (1939) (“We cannot thus rewrite the statute.”); Friedrich v. U.S. Computer 
Servs., 974 F.2d 409, 419 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Even if the court does not believe that Congress intended 
a specific outcome when it drafted a law, the court must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.”) (internal quotations omitted); United States v. Shirah, 253 F.2d 798, 800 (4th 
Cir. 1958) (“[C]ourts are not free to rewrite legislative enactments to give effect to the judges’ ideas 
of policy and fitness or the desirability of symmetry in statutes.”). 
 258.  282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930). 
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E. Waivers of Sovereign Immunity are to be Strictly Construed 
In addition to the textual canons of interpretation that favor this 
Article’s approach to compensation, “government-structuring” canons of 
interpretation, such as presumptions against waivers of sovereign 
immunity, support it as well.  Simply put, “a statute does not waive 
sovereign immunity . . . unless that disposition is unequivocally clear.”259  
Although no Supreme Court case has addressed this issue, the Federal 
Circuit has held that principles of sovereign immunity apply to the 
VICP.260  Recently, in Sebelius v. Cloer,261 a case regarding untimely 
filed vaccine injury petitions, the government, in Supreme Court briefs, 
persuasively advanced the position that sovereign immunity does apply 
to the VICP, and therefore that ambiguities regarding payment should be 
construed against any payment of government funds.262 
In advancing that position,263 the government noted that the VICP 
provides for a monetary claim against the United States by way of suing 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services in an official capacity.264  
This suit, moreover, is substantially similar to a general civil action in 
federal district court in which the United States is represented by the 
Department of Justice.265  The compensation fund is funded by taxes that 
are levied under the taxing power and are held for the benefit of the 
United States to be disbursed in a manner consistent with appropriations 
made by law.266  Additionally, the government argued that the vaccine 
compensation fund is analogous to the Federal Disability Insurance Trust 
                                                          
 259.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 189, at 281. 
 260.  See, e.g., Brice v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 240 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001), 
overruled by Cloer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 654 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Martin ex 
rel. Martin v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 62 F.3d 1403, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Because their 
claim against the United States implicates its sovereign immunity from suit, the alleged jurisdictional 
grant must be narrowly construed.”); Schumacher v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 2 F.3d 1128, 
1135 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 261.  133 S.Ct. 1886 (2013). 
 262.  See Brief for Petitioner at 29–32, Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S.Ct. 1886 (2013) (No. 12-235), 
2013 WL 75285. 
 263.  The respondent in Cloer, however, argued that the VICP is more akin to a commercial 
insurance program and, therefore, principles of sovereign immunity do not apply.  Brief for 
Respondent at 48–50, Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S.Ct. 1886 (2013) (No. 12-235), 2013 WL 476048. 
 264.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(b)(1) (2012) (“[T]he Secretary shall be named as the 
respondent.”); 42 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2012) (defining “Secretary” as “the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services”). 
 265.  See Brief for Petitioner at 29, Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S.Ct. 1886 (2013) (No. 12-236), 2013 
WL 75285. 
 266.  See id. at 30. 
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Fund, to which the Supreme Court has already applied principles of 
sovereign immunity.267 
In its Cloer decision, the Supreme Court appeared to agree with this 
proposition at least implicitly, but noted that the principles of waiver 
apply only if the text is ambiguous.268  With respect to the specific timing 
issues in Cloer, the court held that the text was not ambiguous,269 and, 
therefore, declined to rule definitively on the issue. 
Regarding pre-merit-decision interim fees, however, using Saunders 
(and the Federal Circuit’s perceived conflict), there is, arguendo, an 
ambiguity regarding the treatment of “compensation” in § 15 and § 21.  
Considering the principle that waivers of sovereign immunity are to be 
construed narrowly, the timing of paying fees under the Act should be 
strictly construed—in other words, a presumption in favor of not paying 
fees before a judgment is entered. 
The Federal Circuit and the special masters have abandoned this 
principle of narrowly construing sovereign immunity waivers in their 
interim fee jurisprudence.  For example, in Avera, the court held that 
“[t]here is nothing in the Vaccine Act that prohibits the award of interim 
fees.”270  Even though the fees in Avera were “post-merit” interim fees, 
the Avera analysis ignores the sovereign immunity issues at play.  
Sovereign immunity exceptions must be “unequivocally expressed.”271  
The question, therefore, is not whether the Vaccine Act prohibits the 
payment of government money, but whether the Act allows or mandates 
the payment of taxpayer money in a particular situation. 
There is nothing in the Vaccine Act that positively and affirmatively 
allows a payment of attorneys’ fees before a merit decision has been 
made; on the contrary, under § 15(e) such a determination can be made 
only if “the judgment of the [Court of Federal Claims] on such a petition 
does not award compensation.”272  A judgment requires a decision on the 
merits.  Therefore, these pre-merit-decision interim fees violate both the 
                                                          
 267.  See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 19, Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S.Ct. 1886 (2013) (No. 12-236), 
2013 WL 860453; see also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 479 (1986). 
 268.  Cloer, 133 S.Ct. at 1895. 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis 
added).  This is even more peculiar in light of the Federal Circuit’s familiarity with waivers of 
sovereign immunity. 
 271.  See Blueport Co. v. United States, 533 F3d 1374, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“However, it 
is well-established that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be 
unequivocally expressed.’” (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969))). 
 272.  42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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principles of sovereign immunity and the principle of strictly construing 
waivers thereof. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The current practice of allowing pre-merit-decision interim fees is 
contrary to law and runs afoul of bedrock canons of legal interpretation.  
This practice, moreover, is adversely affecting the very people that the 
Act is designed to protect.  Based on flawed statutory construction, 
attorneys have every incentive to not finish cases, withdraw from 
representation, leave clients in the middle of the bureaucratic VICP, 
incur additional costs at the expense of the taxpayer, and clog the dockets 
of the United States Court of Federal Claims and Federal Circuit.  These 
issues could be easily remedied by adhering to established and sound 
principles of statutory construction.  If interim attorneys’ fees are a good 
policy decision, that decision rests soundly within the province of 
Congress, not the courts. 
 
